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Abstract
This paper is devoted to analyse the problem of animals in Ortega y Gasset and the mature Wittgenstein philosophies. 
The main conclusion is we should prefer the approach of Wittgenstein because it affords a discontinuous continuity 
picture -a degree continuity- between animals and human beings that explains better our epistemic and moral attri-
butions to animals.
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El problema de los animales en Ortega y Wittgenstein
Resumen 
Este artículo está dedicado a analizar el problema de los animales en las filosofías de Ortega y Gasset y el Wittgenstein 
maduro. La conclusión principal es que deberíamos preferir el planteamiento de Wittgenstein porqué nos ofrece una 
imagen de continuidad discontinua -una continuidad de grado- entre los animales y los seres humanos que explica 
mejor nuestras atribuciones morales y epistémicas a los animales.
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ciones morales.
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But surely a machine cannot think! 
-Is that an empirical statement?
No. We say only of a human being and 
what is like one that it thinks.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #360.
In our tradition, even after Darwin and the rise of Etho-
logy, the idea of discontinuity -a radical discontinuity- has 
been a widespread tendency in our way of thinking about 
ourselves in relation to animals, that is, the idea of a diffe-
rence in essence, an unbridgeable gap, an ontological leap. 
Not a difference of degree, not continuity, but otherness: 
the animal as an absolute other -the brutes, the beasts. 
This picture is also present in our linguistic usage when 
we unreflectively divide organic reality into two categories, 
humans and animals, as if all animals make up a unique 
species -the nonhuman species. And obviously this image 
is not only a theoretical picture: important practical and 
moral consequences derive from it. 
In this sense, it is not surprising that Descartes in the 
seventeenth century reduced animals to the condition 
of mere machines and thought that they are deprived 
not only of the capacity for language and thinking, but 
even of the possibility of having mental states. From this 
mechanistic point of view, animals are automats -simple 
matter in movement- whose behaviour is a pure reaction 
to external and internal stimulus, that is, a conduct 
explainable in a pure causal way as an effect -a mecha-
nical response- caused by the pressure of the physical 
environment and the internal state of organism. Animals 
thereby do not participate in rationality and mental life. 
On the contrary, mental life and rationality would only 
be human features. 
However is not necessary to embrace a mechanist out-
line to hold an ontological abyss. In the twentieth century 
the philosophies of Lebenswelt, without denying that ani-
mals -at least some of them- possess mental states or even 
an intelligent behaviour, have emphasised that they do not 
have a World. Animals, unlike humans, do not live inside 
horizons of sense: languages, symbolic realities, history, 
traditions, values, etc. In other words: animals would only 
live in nature among dumb facts and confined in blind 
instincts. And for this reason animals would not be able to 
live in a first person way either, that is, from the past and 
towards the future, with an understanding of themselves 
and planning their life, with some kind of identity; neither 
expecting death... Animals would only be able to be just 
what they were at the beginning: animals are not able to 
want to be someone, nor over time to become someone. 
 It is easy to see that according to this picture 
-the path of radical discontinuity- we could reach the 
conclusion that animals lack morality -they are not moral 
agents, they do not have moral rights-, and so we have no 
moral obligation to them. Because animals do not feel and 
not suffer at all; or because animals, despite of feeling and 
suffering, are not able to give a sense to their feelings and 
sufferings; or because animals do not live in a World, and 
do not plan their lives... The ontological abyss becomes 
a moral abyss, and we are exempt of responsibilities: not 
only can we use animals for our necessities and investi-
gations, but also for our entertainment, or in our artistic 
performances in order to achieve our aesthetic fulfilment. 
Nevertheless this conclusion is a clear non sequitur, a 
good example of the naturalistic fallacy. The lack of relatio-
nal properties does not entail the lack of moral properties: 
the fact that animals are not moral agents, or the fact that 
they are unable to live in a first person way, does not entail 
that they cannot be bearers of moral rights... But neither 
the opposite route would be correct: the possession of 
intrinsic properties -for instance, the capacity for feeling 
and suffering- does not entail the possession of moral 
properties. In reality, the problem is not whether animals 
have rights or not in an intrinsic or relational way, but 
whether we -human beings- recognise them as bearers 
of moral rights. And the case of animals would not be a 
special one: for instance, not only humans beings with 
severe mental disabilities -or even corpses- would have 
moral rights because we recognise them as bearers of moral 
rights, but human beings in general would also have moral 
rights because in the long run of the history of mankind 
they themselves have come to recognise themselves as 
bearers of moral rights. 
Indeed, intrinsic and relational properties can be part 
of a causal explanation of our moral recognition: intrinsic 
and relational properties sometimes work as causes of 
our moral recognition. However in the so-called space of 
reasons and justifications moral recognition will depend 
ultimately on recognition of membership: we recognise 
someone -person or animal- as a bearer of moral rights 
because we recognise him or her as a member of our moral 
community -our actual moral community or our ideal 
moral community. In this sense, if we can use these in-
trinsic and relational properties as reasons for moral rights 
-sometimes the border is blurred, and causes can work as 
reasons: for instance, when we criticise some current moral 
canons-, that is possible because we consider beforehand, 
using other standards of our moral community (actual 
or ideal), that such and such properties are relevant in a 
moral sense. 
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In other words: the unmasking of the naturalistic 
fallacy could be fallacious as well, if it holds up still the 
fact-value dichotomy -the cause-reason dichotomy-, and if 
it tends thereby to moral decisionism, arbitrariness or pure 
conventionalism. On the contrary, intrinsic and relational 
properties, among other material conditions, can explain 
why we are prone to recognise a being as bearer of moral 
rights, but these properties are already loaded with moral 
evaluation, a moral valuation based on the recognition 
of membership to a moral community. Obviously both 
membership to a moral community and moral valuations 
are open, not entirely consistent and fluctuating concepts, 
and for this reason our moral recognitions not only are 
sometimes problematical and controversial, but they 
change over time. Here we have at hands a good example 
of the impurity of life and the impurity of philosophy.
But, let us not go so fast. This paper is devoted to the 
problem of animals in Ortega and the mature Wittgens-
tein -a minor question in their works that can however 
illuminate others more central aspects of their thoughts-, 
so that it seems convenient that we continue our com-
ments with explicit references to their arguments and 
remarks. In this sense I will defend a Wittgensteinian 
view, because in my opinion his approach provides a 
good philosophical comprehension -a good picture- of 
the human-animal relationship, a picture that articulates 
both the idea of moral recognition as recognition of mem-
bership and the idea of a discontinuous continuity. It is 
easy to understand the link: recognition of membership is 
incompatible with radical discontinuity, because to appeal 
to the idea that only of a human being or what is like one 
-or only of one of ours, or what is like one- calls for some 
degree of continuity, a discontinuous continuity. 
Well, in 1934 in Ideas and Beliefs, just in the path of 
philosophies of Lebenswelt, Ortega asserts that animals, 
unlike humans, do not have a World. It is worth following 
his exposition, as well as the context from which this pic-
ture comes. Ideas and Beliefs is a brief essay where Ortega 
affords us some intuitions in certain kinship to the central 
ideas of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Specifically, the view 
that human beings live inside basic beliefs, and that some 
of them, despite not being irremovable, are like hinges for 
the rest of our beliefs and ideas, that is, certainties that, in 
fact and unconsciously, we accept -and we must accept- in 
order to speak, know and act.
As it is well known, Ortega takes as a starting point 
of his reflections the radical reality of human life: the 
individual existence situated in a world of circumstances 
which we must face, an individual perspective. In fact, 
perspective is the being of the World, because Reality 
is only accessible as perspective, individual perspective. 
Perspective is thereby absolute: absolute, yes, but partial, 
because only throughout the social and historical dimen-
sion of each individual existence is possible to discover the 
truth. The reasoning is the following: things do not have 
a being by themselves, and humans must to give them 
a being. Things are a system of facilities and difficulties 
(circumstances, concerns or urgencies, not substances with 
a hidden being), and as human beings are disoriented and 
have an imperative necessity of knowing what to do, they 
must save them and at the same time save themselves. 
That is the seriousness of life: coincidence and fidelity 
with one’s perspective.
Circumstances and perspective also include beliefs and 
ideas -a historical repertory-, because human nature is his-
torical. Every existence has a historical pre-existence, and 
therefore tradition (beliefs and ideas) and circumstances 
form the World in which our lives befall. Specifically, 
beliefs make up the framework, while ideas (concepts) 
are ephemeral creations -unrealities, phantasmagorias, 
in Ortega’s words. But there is nothing irremovable: a 
great deal of our beliefs would have been ideas in the 
past. Ortega focuses on socio-cultural beliefs such as the 
faith in the power of reason and science, and the political 
egalitarianism. Nevertheless, with the examples of the wall 
or the street, Ortega also points out beliefs such as the 
permanent and independent existence of material objects, 
that is, basic beliefs in a more epistemological sense. 
To sum up: human beings have a mission of truth 
-authenticity- that takes as a starting point the World or 
the perspective (circumstances, beliefs and ideas) in which 
they live, and their goal is to agree with -to feel as their 
own- this World or perspective, that is, to coincide with 
these beliefs and ideas by using them to create solutions 
-salvations- for the urgencies or concerns that circumstan-
ces consist of. Ortega characterises this vital project like to 
live in oneself: to escape from the primary unauthenticity, 
perplexity, disorientation or alienation of human life. In 
other words: an authentic first person existence. 
And what about animals? Animals do not have a World, 
they do not live in a World -animals do not live in a 
perspective-, and so they are incapable of authenticity or 
a first person life. In Ideas and Beliefs (Ch. II, #2) Ortega 
explains this abyss between humans and animals from 
the metaphysical concept of reality. In his view, the true 
and primary reality is an enigma, a mystery (something 
without shape), and for this reason something that does 
not deserve the name of “World”. On the other hand, the 
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World -perspective- emerges with humans, and specifically 
through their imagination, his creative imagination. And 
that is the point: animals do not possess imagination. 
Animals always live bound to the senses, confined in the 
net of facilities and difficulties which the true and primary 
reality consist of. In other words: animals always live out 
of themselves. On the contrary, human beings live in 
themselves. 
Obviously this is a curious explanation not exempt of 
contradictions. Animals do not live in a horizon of signi-
ficances -a World-, but they live in the true and primary 
reality. Does that mean that animals, unlike humans, 
know reality in itself? Here reality in itself seems to be an 
anti-Parmenidean mix of Anaximander’s to apeiron and 
Heraclitus’s panta rei: the constant happening of what is 
undetermined and without shape. Or was Ortega’s inten-
tion to say merely that animals live in ‘a’, not in ‘the’, true 
and primary reality? Ortega says that animals live confined 
in a net of facilities and difficulties, but the question is: is 
not a net of facilities and difficulties a determined reality, 
a reality with shape? And is not this reality in some sense 
a horizon of significances, even though a non-linguistic 
horizon of significances?   
In effect, it seems possible to say -as Wittgenstein 
suggests- that animals have a form of life, and they live 
in a world -a horizon of significances-, though this world 
is not linguistic, and their form of life is not a linguistic 
form of life. Moreover, it is also possible to say that bet-
ween their worlds and our world -between their forms 
of life and our form of life- there are transitions: some-
times the pre-linguistic form of life of animals exhibit 
proto-linguistic characters. And these transitions are what 
allow transactions between humans and animals such as 
understanding of behaviour, emotional relationship, the 
ascription of mental life to animals and domestication. 
This is clearly a picture of discontinuous continuity, 
a picture the first element of which should consider hu-
mans as animals. Yet this recognition is not enough. No, 
what is decisive here, as Wittgenstein says openly in On 
Certainty, is to explain the form of life of human beings 
paying attention to the fact that human beings are animals:
I want to regard man here as an animal, as a primitive being 
to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a 
creature in a primitive state: Any logic good enough for a 
primitive means of communication needs no apology from 
us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocina-
tion. (OC, #475)
Form of life (Lebensform) is, for Wittgenstein, an ar-
ticulation of spontaneous natural actions and reactions 
and cultural patterns of behaviour, beliefs and attitudes 
etc., an articulation that cannot always be understood as 
a simple affix or aggregation, but rather in an interwoven 
way for a great deal of relevant cases -for instance, the 
more basic strata of language. In this sense, we might 
say that our linguistic activities have grown from our 
natural actions and reactions, sometimes replacing them, 
sometimes enriching them, sometimes fine tuning them, 
and always making them more sophisticated. And so it 
is sometimes difficult, or impossible, to separate what is 
natural and what is cultural in our behaviour. In this sense, 
it is not surprising that Wittgenstein says in Philosophical 
Investigations that “to imagine a language means to imagine 
a form of life” (PI, I, #19). But what does the concept of 
form of life mean
If we focus on natural actions and reactions, is easy to 
see that the human form of life is, in a very nominalist 
way and contrary to essentialist views of human nature, 
a kind of a posteriori universal: the set of natural actions 
and reactions in which human beings, as a matter of fact, 
tend to coincide. The shared behaviour -the non-reasoned 
agreement- that permits us to agree in our linguistic acti-
vities, that is, in definitions and grammatical judgements, 
although not necessarily in our opinions: the system of 
reference that permit us to learn our own language, and 
interpret unknown languages (PI, I, #206, #241 and 
#242). The human form of life is the given, and so what 
has to be accepted in our analysis once the justifications 
are finished: the bedrock where our philosophical spade 
is turned (PI, I, #217 and II, #345). Language is part of 
our form of life, that is, humans -even in the case of deaf 
people- are animals that talk or, better, that play language 
games: language is part of our natural history (PI, I, #23 
and #25).
In Wittgenstein’s view, actions and reactions must not 
be understood in a causal way as effects to the stimulus 
caused by the constituents of a reality itself -metaphysical 
realism is nonsense. On the contrary, human actions and 
reactions are what give sense to talking about objects, 
properties and facts, that is, human actions and reactions 
divide, identify and re-identify the entities we speak about. 
On the other hand, human natural actions and reactions 
are constitutive of the rules that govern their activities, 
linguistic or not. In brief, the spontaneous, symbolic, 
creative and intentional actions and reactions of human 
beings create a basic world -a basic horizon of sense- in 
which they live. And this basic world becomes over time a 
highly sophisticated cultural world through the history of 
mankind, so that, as we can read in Lectures on Aesthetics, 
to understand and judge, for instance, moral or aesthetical 
The problem of animals in Ortega and Wittgenstein 
Revista Guillermo de Ockham. Vol. 16, No. 2. Julio - diciembre de 2018 - ISSN: 1794-192X Ø 11
language games it would be necessary to know -describe- a 
specific tradition, a whole cultural environment, a whole 
way of living, a cultural form of life (LC, I, #25-#36). 
But, let us focus on the natural form of life, because 
this is what interests us most in relation to animals. As we 
have said before, animals would also have a form of life, 
that is, a set of natural actions and reactions constitutive 
of a horizon of meanings. Moreover, between the animal 
form of life and the human form of life there would be 
transitions and transactions. In this respect however we 
have to bear in mind that it is not possible to speak about 
transitions and transactions without paying attention 
to the particular kind of animals we are considering: 
a chimpanzee is not a sardine, a dog is not a lion and 
neither is a dolphin a snake. Proximity or remoteness in 
the evolutionary scale, and above all the specific actions 
and reactions of animals upon the natural environment, 
makes profound differences. 
Yet Wittgenstein is not so all-encompassing: he is not 
building a theory about animal mind. His remarks -the 
majority of which are about dogs- are only promoting 
a discontinuous continuity picture. So, in Philosophical 
Investigations he writes: 
It is sometimes said: animals do not talk because they lack 
the mental abilities. And this means: “They do not think, 
and that is why they do not talk”. But -they simply do not 
talk. Or better: they do not use language -if we disregard 
the most primitive forms of language. -Giving orders, asking 
questions, telling stories, having a chat, are as much part of 
our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. 
(PI, I, #25) 
The main border between humans and animals is the 
human linguistic praxis: although animals -some ani-
mals- can possess primitive forms of language -expressive, 
intentional behaviour-, there is nothing in this behaviour 
similar to human language games. At this point our natu-
ral history separates from their natural history. However 
this is not a reason to deny that they have mental life, 
because “if one sees the behaviour of a living being, one can see 
its mind” (PI, I, #357), and their behaviour in the relevant 
aspects is similar enough to ours for this attribution. In 
other words: under such-and-such circumstances -in the 
right surroundings-, it makes sense to attribute mental 
predicates to not only human beings but also what is like 
one (PI, I, #360).
In effect, the expressive, intentional and even intelligent 
behaviour of animals, or at least some animals, permits us 
to recognise in them a mental life in some sense similar 
to human mental life -sensations, perceptions, emotions, 
memories, attitudes, desires, beliefs, etc. Nevertheless the 
fact that they do not have the sophisticated human lan-
guage -our linguistic form of life- entails that they do not 
possess, and we cannot attribute them, the sophisticated 
beliefs, attitudes, feelings, concepts and skills that depend 
on intentionality, a holistic connection of concepts and 
beliefs, and knowledge of the rules of language. Here are 
some very illustrative examples of Wittgenstein: 
“The dog means something by wagging his tail”. -What 
grounds would one give for saying this? -Does one also 
say: “By drooping its leaves, the plant means that it needs 
water”? (Z, #521)
We should hardly ask if the crocodile means something 
when it comes at a man with open jaws. And we should 
declare that since the crocodile cannot think there is really 
no question of meaning here. (Z, #522)
If someone behaves in such-and-such a way under such-
and-such circumstances, we say that he is sad. (We say it of 
a dog too). (Z, #526) 
We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not: 
he is afraid his master will beat him tomorrow. Why not? 
(PI, I, #650)
One can imagine an animal angry, fearful, sad, joyful, start-
led. But hopeful? And why not?
A dog believes his master is at door. But can he also believe 
that his master will come the day after tomorrow? -How do 
I do it?- What answer am I supposed to give to this?
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have 
mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the manifes-
tations of hope are modifications of this complicated form 
of life. (PI, II, #1)
Why can a dog feel fear but not remorse? Would it be right 
to say “Because he can’t talk”?      (Z, #518)
A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog can’t 
be a hypocrite, but neither can it be sincere). (PI, II, #363)
Why can’t a dog simulate pain? Is it too honest? Could one 
teach a dog to simulate pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach 
it to howl on particular occasions as if it were in pain, even 
when it isn’t. But the right surroundings for this behaviour 
to be real simulation would still be missing. (PI, I, #250) 
A dog might learn to run to N at the call “N”, and to M 
at the call “M”, but would that mean he knows what these 
people are called? (OC, #540)
[Someone] might surely be taught e.g. to mime pain (not 
with the intention of deceiving). But could this be taught 
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to just anyone? I mean: someone might well learn to give 
certain crude tokens of pain, but without ever spontaneously 
giving a finer imitation out his own insight. (Talent for lan-
guages) (A clever dog might perhaps be taught to give a kind 
of whine of pain but it would never get as far as conscious 
imitation). (Z, #389)
According to Wittgenstein, the recognition of a mental 
life in animals is not a mere projection of our mental 
concepts -an unjustified humanization of animals. But 
neither the result of some methodological approach: for 
instance, that this is the best way -the best hypothesis- in 
which we can explain and predict animal behaviour. No, 
this recognition is rather an expression of our natural 
attitude to animals, an expression of our natural form of 
life: our attitude to human beings and what is like one. 
However, as we just have said, the attribution of mental 
life to animals sometimes can exceed the behaviour of 
animals and creates equivocal ascriptions, because mental 
predicates have grown in our linguistic form of life, and 
their use in the case of animals might suggest that what 
would normally be considered nonsense is possible.  
And what about the possibility that some animals de-
velop a language? In certain occasion Wittgenstein wrote: 
“If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it” 
(PI, II, #327). Why not? Is it so because their form of 
life is very different from ours, and so if lions talk, their 
language would be incommensurable for us? Is that not 
what happens with whales? We perceive in their behaviour 
something that looks like a language, but we are unable to 
understand it. What would the language games of whales 
or lions be? Ortega in Hunting (1949) says that dogs learnt 
to bark in the long process of domestication, maybe as an 
imitation of the expressive features of human voice: unlike 
howl, barking would not be a previous natural behaviour 
as the existence of dumb dogs in some human primitive 
communities shows (see #6). And so, can we consider 
barking as a proto-language? But what would the language 
games of dogs be? No, animals do not talk: an expressive 
voice, or an expressive barking, is not yet a language.
The recognition of a mental life in animals is an expres-
sion of our natural form of life: specifically, an expression 
of our attitude to a human beings and what it is like to 
be one. Now, could we say the same about the moral 
recognition of animals? No necessarily: moral recognition 
belongs to the cultural patterns of our form of life, and in 
the space of reasons, as we saw, moral recognition depends 
ultimately on recognition of membership: we recognise 
someone -person or animal- as bearer of moral rights 
because we recognise him or her as member of our moral 
community. Moral recognition thereby is independent 
of the recognition of mental life, and so it is possible to 
recognise that an animal has mental life, but not moral 
rights: this is probably the attitude of the majority of 
lovers of hunting or bullfighting. And in this case, unlike 
the exploitation of animals in experiments or in factory 
farming, justifications are usually understood in terms 
of aesthetic or traditional values. Or even in relation to 
some kind of human authenticity. Here Ortega’s point of 
view is illuminating.
In Hunting (see #7) Ortega asserts that the aim of 
sportive hunting -hunting nowadays in the West- is not 
for entertainment nor for food, but to return to the most 
authentic and primary form of life -Ortega also uses this 
concept in this context- of human beings. Men were and 
are hunters, and so hunting would be the opportunity for 
a short-lived return to our origins without abandoning 
our historical achievements. This fact would explain 
the happiness that hunting produces in human beings. 
Moreover -and at this point Ortega’s moral justifications 
begin- hunting manifests and reproduces the destiny, the 
tragedy of life: to hunt and to be hunted, that is, men 
have to hunt and animals have to be hunted. In nature 
-and in society as well- egalitarianism does not exist, but 
a natural hierarchy, aristocratism. For this reason, Ortega 
considers a perversion the recent British fashion -so refi-
ned- of shooting photographs to animals as a substitute 
of authentic hunting.
In turn, in Bullfighting, apart from the aesthetic spa-
tial and cinematic values derived from the more or less 
bullfighter’s innate understanding of the bravery of the 
bull -the onslaught of bulls-, Ortega considers bullfighting 
from the point of view that the best moral homage to ani-
mals is sometimes to kill them in an ritual way: specifically, 
in the case of bullfighting, a ritual dance of death -the 
death of bull- in which the bullfighter at the same time 
dances in front of the possibility of his own death. That is 
the authenticity, the existential depth of bullfighting: an 
authenticity that would express both the severity of life for 
human beings and a profound existential respect towards 
the bull -an existential respect without moral rights. 
Surely in these narratives Ortega was influenced by 
some kind of romantic spirit: destiny, tragedy of life, death 
as a test of true existence, authenticity, etc. And specifically 
in the case of bullfighting Ortega bore in mind a very 
bizarre conception of the equally bizarre idea of a Spanish 
soul. However, fortunately none of that is necessary, and 
it is possible to see the matter differently: for instance, 
to consider animals -at least some animals- as an oppor-
tunity for our moral improvement: to recognise animals 
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as bearers of some moral rights can make human beings 
more human. Likewise it is possible to think that abuse 
and mistreatment of animals -cruelty- tends to cancel in 
us our own moral ideals. This is a challenge to our form 
of life: to recognise animals -at least some animals- as 
members of our moral community. 
And in this recognition, as we have said before, 
although intrinsic and relational properties cannot work 
as pure reasons or justifications, however can be part of a 
causal explanation of our moral recognition of animals, 
and so they also can sometimes work as reasons -impure 
reasons, of course-, insofar as intrinsic and relational pro-
perties are already loaded with a moral valuation based on 
the recognition of membership to a moral community. 
Moral recognition thereby is not a pure conventional re-
ality, but it is connected to -has grown from- very general 
facts of nature: for instance, the expressive, intentional 
and intelligent behaviour of animals -at least some ani-
mals- that permits us to recognise in them a mental life 
in some sense similar to human mental life. To sum up: 
the impurity of life, and the impurity of philosophy too.
References
Ortega y Gasset, J. (1942). Ideas y creencias. Madrid: Omegalfa.
Ortega y Gasset, J. (1960). La caza y los toros. Madrid: Omegalfa.
Wittgenstein, L. (1966). Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
Psycho- logy and Religious Belief. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1966). Philosophical Ivestigations. Oxford: 
Wiley Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Zettel. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On certainty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
